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Learning by Doing, Spillover and Shakeout in Monopolistic Competition
by Horst Albach and Jim Jin*
This paper studies the impact of learning by doing on shakeouts in monopolistic
competition. Firms have different initial costs and set prices to maximize current profits
in each period. Although all firms make positive profits at the beginning and grow for a
certain period of time, shakeouts may occur as costs are reduced through learning by
doing and spillovers. We give a necessary condition for shakeouts in terms of the relative
effectiveness of proprietary learning and the industry-wide learning. Given this condition,
shakeouts are more likely to occur when the learning potential is large, the market is
small, the proprietary learning is effective and spillovers are weak. In the absence of any
strategic learning or predatory pricing, learning by doing can create significant market
barriers.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Lerneffekte, Externalitäten und Marktaustritte bei monopolistischer Konkurrenz
In diesem Aufsatz werden die Auswirkungen von Lerneffekten durch (Produktions-)er-
fahrung auf Marktaustritte (sog. „shakeouts“) im Kontext monopolistischer Konkurrenz
untersucht. Unternehmen haben unterschiedliche Anfangskosten und maximieren ihre
laufenden Periodengewinne. Auch wenn zunächst alle Marktteilnehmer Profite erzielen
und über einen bestimmten Zeitraum hinweg wachsen, kann es in einem fortgeschrittenen
Stadium zu Marktaustritten kommen. Grund dafür ist die Reduktion der Produktions-
kosten durch Lerneffekte und Externalitäten. Wir zeigen, welche notwendige Bedingung
an eigene und industriespezifische Lerneffekte erfüllt sein muß, damit es zu Marktaus-
tritten kommen kann. Ist diese Bedingung erfüllt, sind Marktaustritte um so wahrschein-
licher, je größer das Potential zur Realisierung von Lerneffekten, je kleiner der Markt, je
effektiver eigenes Lernen und je geringer der externe Effekt ist. Auch in Abwesenheit
von strategischem Lernen und markteintrittsverhindernder Preissetzung können Lern-
effekte bedeutende Marktbarrieren begründen.
                                           
* We thank Dieter Köster for his valuable work to simulate the model and Hans Mewis for
his various comments and suggestions. The responsibility for any remaining errors is
authors'.1. Introduction
In this paper we examine how learning by doing and spillovers create market barriers
without incumbents' strategic learning or predatory pricing. Learning by doing, even if
not conducted strategically, can significantly reduce the number of viable firms given the
market size, product substitutability and initial cost structure. It seems that the most
effective way to dismantle such market barriers is to increase spillovers.
Since the seminar work of Arrow (1962), the concept of learning by doing has been an
important subject in the economics literature. Empirical studies have found a significantly
positive relation between a firm's productivity and its production experience in various
industries. Recent studies also showed that firms can learn from others' experience as
well as from their own in a wide range of market structures. The examples include
Zimmerman (1982) for the nuclear power plants, Lieberman (1989) for the chemical
processing industry, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) for agriculture.
Meanwhile theoretical models suggest that learning by doing has a strong impact on
market competition and performance. In a Cournot oligopoly model Spence (1981)
argued that proprietary learning gives early entrants cost advantages and creates entry
barriers. He also discussed the impact of spillovers in a two period model. More
rigorously, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) showed in a two period Cournot duopoly that
spillovers reduce firms' incentives for strategic learning. Further, Ghemawat and Spence
(1985) demonstrated with a symmetric Cournot oligopoly that spillovers substantially
undercut the entry barriers created by learning. In all these models learning by doing
blocks entry ex ante since rational firms do not enter if they can not make profits or
survive in the market.
In the real world firms can not fully anticipate their success or failure before entry.
Shakeouts are often a common feature during the early stage of market evolution (see
Gort and Klepper 1982). In particular firms may exit having enjoyed positive or even
increasing profits before declining into non-existence. Learning by doing may explain this
phenomena of post-entry selection. Cabral and Riordan (1994) demonstrated how an
early entrant can build up its dominant position through learning by doing and set
predatory prices in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly. In a two period perfectly
competitive model Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy (1997) recently showed learning by
doing may force some firms to exit the market despite their experience gained earlier.
Also in perfectly competition Jovanovic and Lach (1989) studied the impact of learning
by doing on technology diffusion, which is modeled as entry of new machines and exit of
old ones.
Not all plausible features of shakeouts, however, have been included in the previous
models. First of all, new firms may not be blocked from entry right away, or may not be2
driven out of the market in two periods, but survive a substantial time before the exit.
Secondly, instead of duopoly and perfect competition, the number of firms may be rather
large. Finally, because of a long time horizon and many competitors, firms may not be
perfectly rational to strategically gain production experience through learning by doing.
While the existing models illustrate the strategic learning by rational firms, they may
overlook the complexity of the industry evolution over a longer time with many non-
strategic firms.
To complement the existing theory of learning by doing, this paper describes a shakeout
process due to learning by doing and shakeouts in monopolistic competition. It considers
how shakeouts occur after entrants have entered a market for sometime and gained
production experience. The entry barriers created by learning are different from the
existing models. First, instead of blocking entry ex ante, the entrants may be doing well
for a long time before they decline and eventually exit the market. Secondly the entrants
may be driven out of the market without any strategic maneuver of the incumbents, such
as predatory pricing or strategic learning. This is more likely to happen in monopolistic
competition since firms are not fully rational and proprietary learning may be negligible
relative to the industry-wide learning because of a single firm's tiny market share.
Needless to say that a general model would exclude any clear-cut solution. Facing the
usual trade-off for economists we use a simple linear demand and learning model to
describe a multi-period dynamic process of individual and the industry outputs. We find a
necessary condition for shakeouts in terms of the relative effectiveness of proprietary
learning and spillovers. Given this condition shakeouts are more likely when the market
is smaller, the number of firms is larger and learning is more proprietary. Given the
demand and cost structures, learning by doing can significantly reduce the number of
viable firms, as argued earlier by Albach (1995).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 solves the
dynamic process of firms' outputs and costs, and gives the shakeout conditions. The
impacts of the cost structure, demand function and effectiveness of learning are analyzed
in Section 4, which is followed by the concluding remarks in the last section.3
2. Model
There is a n-firm monopolistically competitive market with n differentiated (substitute)
goods and a competitive market with a numeraire good whose price is normalized to 1.
Denote firms i's output in period t by xit and the nu1 output vector by xt. Assume that the
representative consumer has a fixed income y and a quadratic utility function all the time:













where a > 0 and 0 < r < 1. When r approaches 1, the product substitutability becomes
perfect; while r = 0 implies independent products. Denote firm i's price in period t by pit
and the nu1 price vector by pt. Given pt and his budget constraint x0t + ptxt d y, the
representative consumer chooses x0t and xt to maximize his utility (1). Since the utility
function is strictly concave in xt, the optimal consumption can be solved from the
following first-order condition:




From (2) we can solve firm i's demand function in period t as:
xit = 
1




Let cit denote firm i's marginal cost in period t. In every period t each firm i chooses pit to
maximize its current profit xit(pit-cit), where xit is given by (3). We assume that firms do
not strategically make use of the opportunity of learning by doing given the limited
rationality. As every firm's profit function is strictly concave in its price, the market
equilibrium in monopolistic competition can be solved by the following first-order
condition:
(1-r)a - 2[1+(n-2)r]pit + [1+(n-2)r]cit + r¦
jzi
n
pjt = 0 (4)
Assume that learning by doing and spillovers reduces every firm i's marginal cost linearly
in its own accumulated output and the industry accumulated output. Let ¦
W=1
t-1
xiW be firm i's






xiW be the accumulated industry4
output during the same time. To simplify notation, denote firm i's initial marginal cost in
the first period by ci. Then its marginal cost in period t (> 1) can be written as follows:










where D and Et 0. E indicates the cost reduction due to one unit of the industry output,
D is the cost reduction due to one unit of a firm's own production experience not shared
by other firms. In the R&D literature the spillover coefficient is usually defined as one
firm's cost reduction due to another firm's one unit cost reduction by its own R&D.
Similarly our spillover coefficient T would be E/(D+E). When D = 0, every firm learns
equally from any other firm's production experience, T = 1, spillovers are perfect. If E =
0, T = 0, learning by doing is proprietary. The learning process continues till the cost falls
to a minimum level c _t 0.
We rank firms according to their efficiencies, i.e. ci+1 t ci for all i < n. Firm 1 is the most
efficient firm and firm n is the most inefficient one. We assume that every firm can
produce something in the first period. Shakeouts occur when some firms exit a market a
certain period after their entry. Obviously this can only occur before all firms reach the
minimum cost c _, i.e. during the phase of learning by doing. In each period firms realize
their cost reduction from the last period and choose new prices given new costs. (3), (4)
and (5) define a dynamic interaction among all firms' costs, prices and outputs in all
periods given initial costs. The dynamic process goes on till either some firms reach the
minimum cost or some exit the market. Our model will characterize a necessary and a
sufficient condition for shakeouts and evaluate the impact of  the cost structure, the
demand function and the effectiveness of learning on shakeouts.
3. Industry dynamics











Substituting (6) into (3), we can solve firm i's equilibrium output. To simplify the







Plugging them into the expression of firm i's equilibrium output in period t, we have
xit = I[a + V¦
j=1
n
cjt - (1+nV)cit] (7)
To ensure that firm n's output is positive in the first period, (7) implies that the following
inequality must hold:




Otherwise, the most inefficient firm n cannot enter the market at all and its shakeout is
out of the question. This could be the case when incumbents have gained enough cost
advantages through learning by doing and block new entry, as discussed by the previous
models. Here we only consider the case where (8) holds.
Given (5), we can rewrite firm i's marginal cost in period t as




(7) describes every firm's output as a function of all firms' current costs, and (9) relates
every firm's current cost to its previous cost and all firms' outputs in the last period.
These two equations (7) and (9) together present the dynamic process of the market
evolution. From them we can solve the path of any firm i's output and its cost before the
most efficient firm 1 reaches the minimum cost c _ or the least efficient firm n exits the
market. Denote the industry average marginal cost in the first period, ¦
i=1
n
ci/n, by c. Our
result can be given as
Proposition 1: Before any firm exhausts its learning potential or exits the market, firm i's
cost and output in period t (t 1) can be described as follows:
cit = a - (a-c)[1+I(D+nE)]t-1 - (c-ci)(1+DV/r)t-1 (10)
xit = I(a-c)[1+I(D+nE)]t-1 + I(c-ci)(1+nV)(1+DV/r)t-1 (11)
Proof: see Appendix A.




xit = I(a-c)[1+I(D+nE)]t-1 (12)6
The industry output increases at a constant rate I(D+nE). Every firm's output have two
parts with different growth rates. One is identical for all firms and grows at the same
pace as the industry does, the other reflects a firm's cost advantage/disadvantage due to
its initial cost. The industry growth rate, I(D+nE), depends on both D and E, while the
individual growth rate, DV/r, only depends on D. For those firms whose costs are lower
than the average c, both parts are positive and their outputs always increase. For the
other firms including firm n, the second part is negative and potentially can dominate the
first. When this happens, firm n must be the first to exit the market. (10) and (11) are
valid up to either firm 1's cost falls to c _ or firm n's output falls to zero.
From (10) and (11) we can easily obtain the cost and output differences between any two
firms as
cit - cjt = (ci-cj)(1+DV/r)t-1 (13)
xit - xjt = I(c-ci)(1+nV)(1+DV/r)t-1 (14)
The differences increase over time as long as c1t > c _ and xnt > 0. So the inefficient firms'
cost disadvantage becomes larger and larger during the learning phase. However, as its
own cost also decreases over time, whether its output will fall to zero depends on which
of these two trends is stronger. Dividing firm i's output in (11) by the industry output in








By the definition of V and I, DV/r > I(D+nE) if and only if DV > E. The inequality means
that proprietary learning is significant relative to industry-wide learning. Then the ratio
(1DV/r)/[1+I(D+nE)] is less than 1. The absolute value of the second term of (15) falls
over time, and every firm's market share converges to 1/n. When DV = E, all firms'
market shares remain constant. In either cases no shakeout could occur.
Hence, shakeouts never occur if DV < E. Given D and E, one can check that the
inequality is more likely to hold when the number of firms or the substitutability decrease
because V rises in n and r. In terms of the spillover coefficient T, it is easy to see that the
inequality is guaranteed if T t r/(2-r). The more substitutable the products are, the more
spillovers we need to guarantee firms' survival.
When DV > E, the second term of (12) grows faster than the first one. The output of the
least efficient firm n may increase initially and start falling afterwards. When the second
term eventually exceeds the first, its output becomes zero and the shakeout occurs. Then
firm n - 1 becomes least efficient. A new process starts again with the new initial costs7
and more shakeouts may occur. Since the new process also follows (10) and (11), we
need only consider firm n's survival. After firm 1 reaches its minimum cost, other firms'
costs continue to fall and the danger for firm n's exit still exists. But as firm 1's output
starts falling, the pressure on firm n is somehow reduced. To keep our analysis simple,
we focus on shakeouts when no firm has exhausted its learning potential. Hence the
question is whether firm n's output shrinks to zero before firm 1's cost reaches its
minimum c _. We need to find out that under which condition this happens. This is a
sufficient condition for shakeouts. It would be a necessary condition too, if all firms
except for firm n have the same cost.
Let T denote the time when firm 1's cost reaches c _. From (10) the value of T can be
determined by the following condition:
(a-c)[1+I(D+nE)]T-1 + (c-c1)(1+DV/r)T-1 = a - c _ (16)
As the left hand side of (16) is monotonically increasing in T, there is a unique solution
for T given parameters c1, cn, c, c _, a, n, r, D and E.
Given DV > E, if xnt' > 0, we know that xnt > 0 for all t < t'. Thus firm n's danger of exit






where T is determined by (16). Hence we can give the following result.
Proposition 2: A necessary condition for shakeouts is that spillovers are weak relatively
to the proprietary learning (E < VD). A sufficient condition is that (17) holds.
If no shakeout occurs, firms reach the minimum cost one after another. A firm's output
starts to fall after its cost reaches c _, as other firms' costs continue to fall. The other firms
keep growing till they catch up with the more efficient ones. Eventually all firms share
the market equally. The final production cost is the same either shakeouts occur or not.
In terms of the long run social efficiency, however, no shakeout implies a higher industry
output and social welfare in the long run. In such a case, the efficiency gain associated
with fewer firms due to learning by doing and initial cost advantages is temporary. The
long run social loss cannot be prevented by conventional competition policies because no
behavior of restraint of trade is involved, such as predatory pricing or strategic learning.
To ensure the long run competitiveness we need something different from usual antitrust
policies. For this purpose we now consider how the sufficient condition (17) is affected
by the parameters of the model.8
4. Impact of cost, demand and effectiveness of learning
We now consider the impacts of our parameters on the likelihood of shakeouts. The
parameters can be divided into three categories regarding the cost structure (c1, cn, c, c _),
the demand function (a, n, r) and the effectiveness of learning (D, E). We will see how
each of them affects the likelihood of shakeouts by using the conditions (16) and (17).
The impacts of cost parameters on shakeout can be seen intuitively. For instance, when
firm n's inefficiency is more significant (higher cn given c1 and c), it faces more
disadvantages all the time. Similarly, when the other firms are more efficient (lower c1 or
c given cn), they produce more and firm n produces less in every period. Thus firm n's
cost disadvantage is bigger and the chance to survive is slimmer. When the learning
potential is larger (lower c _). It prolongs the learning period and also increases the
possibility of shakeouts.
When the initial costs are symmetric, i.e. cn = c, (17) never holds and all n firms can
survive. Firm n cannot survive if the costs are sufficiently asymmetric, i.e. cn - c, is bigger
than a certain value. We call this critical value the viable cost disadvantage for firm n.
Without learning by doing, (8) implies that firm n can survive if cn - c > (a-c)/(1+nV).
Comparing with (17), we know that with learning by doing, the viable initial cost
disadvantage, cn - c, falls by a proportion of [1+I(D+nE)]T-1/(1+DV/r)T-1. From (16) we
see that as c _ falls, T must increase to keep (16) valid. So the viable initial cost
disadvantage falls more. This implies
Corollary 1:  Learning by doing reduces the viable initial cost disadvantage for the
inefficient firm. The reduction is more significant when the learning potential is bigger.
For the demand parameters, the impact of the product substitutability seems intuitive.
When products are more substitutable (larger r), competition is fiercer for any given
costs. Prices are lower, outputs are higher in each period, and the cost differences
between efficient and inefficient firms are larger. Hence learning by doing gives more
advantages to efficient firms and the chance of shakeouts increases.
But the impacts of the market size and the number of firms are not intuitively clear.
When the market is larger (a is bigger), all firms produce more for any given costs. So
firms learn more quickly. Cost differences may become larger which increases the chance
of shakeouts. On the other hand, however, the inefficient firms have a better chance to
survive when the market is larger given the same cost differences. The overall effect of a
larger market on shakeouts is unclear. The ambiguity also exists for the number of firms.
When the number n is large given the initial cost structure, it is more difficult for the least
efficient firm to survive. Nevertheless, every firm produces less in each period and learns
more slowly when there are more firms. As every firm's market share decreases, the9
industry-wide learning becomes more significant relative to the proprietary learning.
Hence the learning advantages of efficient firms may be smaller and the overall effect on
shakeouts is not known. The ambiguity can be resolved using (16) and (17) to evaluate
the impact of a and n. We find
Corollary 2: The shakeout is more likely to occur if the market is smaller or the number
of firms is larger.
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Figure 1 illustrates the impact of a larger market size and a larger number of firms. To
keep our simulation simple, we assume a small n = 3. The solid curve indicates the
output path of the inefficient firm when its initial cost is 0.67 and the other 2 firms' costs
are 0.64. The other parameters are chosen as c _ = 0, a = 1, r = 0.75, D = 0.03 and E =
0.01. The vertical line indicates the time when 2 efficient firms reach the minimum cost
calculated according to (16) (period 46). Since firm 3's output is still positive at that
time, it can survive and no shakeout occurs. The short dashed-curve is drawn under the
same conditions except for a smaller market (a = 0.95). Firms produce less and learn10
more slowly in a smaller market. Consequently the inefficient firm's output falls to zero
(period 43) before other firms reach their minimum costs. The shakeout occurs. The long
dashed-curve differs from the standard one only in 3 efficient firms instead of 2. The
output of the inefficient firm is significantly lower and falls to zero (period 30) well
before its rivals exhaust their learning potentials. Comparing with the standard case, we
see that the market allows just 3 firms to survive eventually.
As we mentioned earlier, without learning by doing, the most inefficient firm n cannot
survive if cn - c > (a - c)/(1+nV). This inequality holds when n is sufficiently large. With
learning by doing, (17) can be valid for a smaller n because of the additional term
(1+DV/r)T-1/[1+I(D+nE)]T-1. It means that the number of viable firms is reduced because
of learning by doing. As we argued earlier that the value of the additional term is larger
when c _ is lower, the reduction of the number of viable firms is more significant when the
learning potential is larger.
We now consider the impacts of the effectiveness of proprietary and industry-wide
learning. When the proprietary learning is more effective, the more efficient firms have
bigger advantages for one period learning. But in the next period the low costs resulted
from learning lead to a higher industry output, which benefits the inefficient firm through
spillovers. Thus in a multi-period dynamic model the more effective proprietary learning
may actually benefit the inefficient firm. Similarly, if the industry-wide learning becomes
more effective, the advantage of more efficient firms may be weakened. On the other
hand, all firms learn faster, cost differences may increase faster and make shakeouts more
likely. The ambiguities can be resolved by (16) and (17). We can show that shakeouts are
more likely when D is larger or E is smaller. Hence we have
Corollary 3: The shakeout is more likely if proprietary learning is more effective, or
spillovers are weaker.
Proof: see Appendix C.
Figure 2 demonstrates the impacts of the effectiveness of learning. The solid curve
represents the same standard case as before. The short dashed-curve reflects more
effective proprietary learning (D = 0.04). When all firms learn faster from their own
production experience, the inefficient firm's output falls to zero (period 34) before the
efficient firms could reach the minimum cost (period 39). The long dashed-curve shows
the impact of weaker spillovers (E = 0.008). As every firm learns more slowly, the
shakeout occurs in period 45 before the efficient firms could go down to the bottom of
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Knowing the impact of every parameter on shakeouts, one can think of a policy
instrument to ensure the competitiveness of an industry. Among all the parameters we
have discussed, the spillover effect is easiest to be changed by policies, such as
encouraging information flow, relaxing patent protection and so on. When E increases
and D + E remains constant, D must decreases the same amount as E rises, but the
spillover coefficient rises. According to Corollary 3, more firms can survive and the
market becomes more competitive in the long run. Further, as D + nE increases, (12)
implies that the industry output grows faster. Thus the social welfare rises during the
learning phase. However, an increases in E while keeping D + E constant implies that
firms' proprietary knowledge is not repetitious so that the total cost reduction is
significantly improved by sharing production experience. In the worst case of repetitious
knowledge, the total cost reduction remains the same as proprietary learning is converted
into public knowledge. This means D + nE remains constant while E rises and D falls.
Even in this case, shakeouts are still less likely, the industry growth does not change.
Hence more spillovers are socially optimal both in terms of the industry growth and in
terms of the competitiveness of the eventual market structure.12
5. Concluding remarks
This paper describes a dynamic process of a monopolistically competitive market with
learning by doing and spillovers. We examine the possibility of new entrants' survival
without strategic learning or predatory pricing. We found that even though a new firm
enter a market successfully at the beginning and grows for a certain period of time, its
eventual survival is not guaranteed. Shakeouts occur when learning by doing creates
sufficient cost advantages for efficient firms such that inefficient firms have to exit the
market even though their costs have been reduced through production experience. This
is possible only if spillovers are weak relative to the proprietary learning (E < VD). When
this condition is satisfied, whether shakeouts occur depend on three aspects of the
market competition: the cost structure, the demand function and the effectiveness of
learning. In particular we found that learning by doing significantly reduces the viable
initial cost disadvantage for inefficient firms. Shakeouts are more likely to occur when
the market is smaller, the number of firms is larger, the proprietary learning is more
effective and spillovers are weaker.
The main message of the paper is that learning by doing can create significant market
barriers without any strategic actions of incumbents. Compared with the no shakeout
case, the long run industry output and social welfare are lower. Although in the short run
shakeouts are consistent with "fair competition" in production efficiencies, it may not be
socially optimal to allow these temporary cost advantages to become permanent
privileges. To dismantle the barriers created by learning by doing and promote the long
run efficiency, it seems that the most effective way is to enhance the effectiveness of
industry-wide learning or spillovers. This is especially true when individual learning will
not be discouraged by strong spillovers, such as in monopolistic competition.
To solve the industry dynamics, we made a couple of simplifying assumptions. We
assume that the learning process is linear till the minimum cost is reached. It would be
more appropriate that the learning curve approaches the limit gradually due to
diminishing returns. But this will exclude a simple dynamic solution. Furthermore we
abstract from any active R&D. Doing so might obscure the effects of learning by doing.
At the same time it might be a promising way to enrich the model. In the present model it
is always the smallest firm that exits the market and no firm can leapfrog others. The
introduction of R&D would eliminate this limitation and might be worthwhile for our
future research.13
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APPENDIX A:
We first consider the industry output Xt. Summing (7) for all i, we get




Rewrite (A1)  as I¦
j=1
n
cjt = Ina - Xt and substitute it into (7). By the definition of I and V,
I(1+nV) = s/r. We have
xit = V[
a - cit
r  - Xt) (A2)
Substituting (A2) into (19), we have firm i's cost in period t (t > 1)
cit = (1+
DV
r )cit-1 - 
DVa
r  + (VD-E)Xt-1 (A3)







cjt-1 - (D+nE)Xt-1 (A4)
From (A1) we get







(A4) and (A5) imply Xt = [1 + I(D+nE)]Xt-1. As X1 = In(a-c), we solve the industry
output in period t as
Xt = In(a-c)[1 + I(D+nE)]t-1 (A6)
Substituting (A6) into (A3), we know that firm i's cost follows the difference equation
cit = (1+
DV
r )cit-1 - 
DVa
r  + (VD-E)In(a-c)[1+I(D+nE)]t-2 (A7)
The unique solution of (A7) is (10). Plugging (10) and (A6) into (A2), we get (11).15
APPENDIX B:
(i) If a increases and T remains unchanged, the left hand side of (16) rises more than the
right hand side. To keep he two sides of (16) equal, T must fall. Then, the left hand
side of (17) falls and the right hand side rises. Hence (17) is less likely to hold. The
shakeout is less likely.
(ii) Suppose that E in (16) were equal to DV, then (16) became (a-c1)(1+DV/r)T-1 = a - c _.
When n increases, so does V. As (1+DV/r)T-1 must remain constant, T must fall. Now
recall that true E < DV, so T actually does not need to fall so much. This means that
(1+DV/r)T-1 actually increases. To keep (16) valid, [1+I(D+nE)]T-1 must decrease.
Therefore the ratio of these two rises when n increases. As 1 + Vn also rises in n, (17)
is more likely to hold.  
APPENDIX C:
(i) When D rises, if E = DV, (16) requires (1+DV/r)T-1 to be constant and T must fall. As
the true E < DV, T actually does not fall so much, hence (1+DV/r)T-1 must rise as D
increases. This implies that [1+I(D+nE)]T-1 must fall. Therefore the left hand side of
(17) increases and the shakeout is more likely.
(ii) As E rises, the ratio (1+DV/r)/[1+I(D+nE)] decreases. Also, (16) implies that T
decreases. So the left hand side of (17) falls and the inequality is less likely to hold.        
__